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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-1333 
________________ 
 
HAMID ABDUL-SHABAZZ, 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ADMINISTRATOR EAST JERSEY STATE PRISON;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE 
OF NEW JERSEY 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2:14-cv-03959) 
District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2020 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2020) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
  
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
   Hamid Abdul-Shabazz appeals the order of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  Because the state court reviewing his case did not unreasonably apply 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we will affirm the District Court’s denial 
of habeas relief.   
I. Background1 
Petitioner was convicted for crimes related to the armed robbery of Joseph 
Robinson, who made an in-person identification of him a month after the robbery.  Trial 
counsel argued that Robinson might have been shown Petitioner’s mug shot, among 
others, on the day of the robbery but failed to pick out Petitioner as the perpetrator at that 
time.  In post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings in state court, Petitioner was 
represented by a different attorney who confirmed that his mug shot was indeed in the 
database used to generate the group of photos shown to Robinson.  On that basis, 
Petitioner claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by conducting a 
deficient investigation and thereby prejudicing his defense.   
After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition.  
The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied his petition 
for certification.  On federal habeas review, the District Court denied Petitioner’s 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).  Because the District Court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary.  Abdul-Salaam v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
895 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 2018).  
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petition.  We granted a certificate of appealability as to Petitioner’s “claim that counsel 
performed ineffectively by failing to properly investigate whether his photo was in the 
database shown by police to the victim shortly after the crime.”  App. 30.   
II. Discussion 
Before us, Petitioner reiterates his argument that trial counsel’s investigation was 
deficient and resulted in prejudice.  In addition, in an effort to bolster that argument, 
Petitioner contends that counsel’s failure to object to a related jury instruction 
“compounded counsel’s ineffectiveness.”  Appellant’s Br. 31.  We address these alleged 
deficiencies separately. 
A. Failure to Investigate  
Where state courts have ruled on the merits of the petitioner’s claim, we defer 
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to the “last reasoned 
decision,” Abdul-Salaam, 895 F.3d at 265 (citation omitted)—here, the Superior Court’s 
decision2—and we grant relief only if this decision “was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  
Here, the District Court concluded that the Superior Court reasonably analyzed 
Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland’s general standard,  
looking first to whether counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, to whether the 
defendant suffered prejudice.  When deferring under AEDPA to a state court’s Strickland 
                                                 
2 We do not treat the Appellate Division’s decision as the last reasoned decision 
because it affirmed the denial of PCR relief “substantially for the reasons” stated by the 
Superior Court.  App. 146; see Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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analysis, our review is “doubly deferential” because we take “a highly deferential look at 
counsel’s performance through the deferential lens of § 2254(d).”  Cullen v. Pinholster, 
563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  We ask not 
whether “the state court’s determination . . . was incorrect but whether that determination 
was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.”  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 
111, 123 (2009) (citation omitted). 
We agree with the District Court that Petitioner has not made that showing here.3  
Trial counsel sought from the Passaic police the group of photos actually shown to 
Robinson, but the computer did not record which ones were displayed.  Without 
confirmation that Robinson actually saw Petitioner’s photo, trial counsel did the next best 
thing:  He argued that Robinson might have seen Abdul-Shabazz’s photo and that the 
State presented no contrary evidence.  Specifically, in cross-examining a Passaic police 
officer, trial counsel elicited testimony that “right now we have a case where Mr. 
Robinson could have looked at Mr. Shabazz’s photo and not identified him.”  App. 106.  
Then, in closing argument, trial counsel emphasized that “the State[] has not presented 
any testimony to you to show that Mr. Shabazz’s picture was not . . . [one of the] pictures 
that he looked at, meaning Robinson on [the day of the robbery].”  App. 17.  But because 
counsel’s investigation did not confirm that Petitioner’s picture definitively was in the 
                                                 
3 While we agree with the Superior Court that Petitioner failed to demonstrate 
performance and thus cannot say this aspect of the Superior Court’s determination was 
unreasonable, we address here only the prejudice prong as that suffices to resolve this 
case.  
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database, Petitioner argues that he was unable to effectively attack Robinson’s credibility, 
resulting in prejudice.   
For trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance to be prejudicial, there must be 
a “reasonable probability . . . sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” that but 
for the alleged error, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Petitioner has not established that reasonable probability.  
Had counsel confirmed the photo was in the database, there still would have been no 
evidence that it was actually in the group of photos Robinson viewed, which were drawn 
from the database based on the reported characteristics of the perpetrator, including age, 
race, and—perhaps, although the officer could not recall with certainty—build.  Given 
that the group of photos shown to Robinson was merely a subset of the database, and 
there is conflicting testimony about whether Robinson’s description of the perpetrator at 
that time would have filtered for Petitioner’s photo, it is speculative at best—even with 
confirmation that his photo was in the database—whether it was actually shown to 
Robinson.   
Thus, the argument Petitioner contends trial counsel could have made if he had 
properly investigated is the very argument counsel did make: that Robinson might have 
seen Abdul-Shabazz’s mug shot the day of the robbery but failed to identify him at that 
time.  Because there is not a “substantial” likelihood, Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 
112 (2011), that the jury would have disbelieved Robinson’s in-person identification had 
it known Petitioner’s photo definitively was in the database, the Superior Court was not 
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unreasonable in concluding that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be denied 
“primarily under the second prong of the [Strickland] test.”  App. 135. 
B. Failure to Challenge Jury Instruction4 
 At trial, when the State began to ask the police officer if mug shots from arrests in 
other jurisdictions could have been included in the Passaic database, trial counsel moved 
for a mistrial because the line of questioning revealed information about Petitioner’s 
other arrests.  The trial judge then instructed the jury:  “So you don’t misunderstand the 
prosecutor’s question and think from it that maybe there was an arrest somewhere 
else, . . .  there was no arrest that would have generated a photograph.  An arrest made 
someplace out of the municipality of Passaic that would have generated a photograph that 
would be in that system.”  App. 112–13.   
Petitioner urges that this jury instruction “compounded counsel’s ineffectiveness,” 
Appellant’s Br. 31, presumably because, if stripped from its context, the words “there 
was no arrest that would have generated a photograph” could imply that he was not in the 
Passaic database.  But in context, it is clear that the questioning had been about arrests 
outside of Passaic, and the jury instruction spoke only to mug shots from other 
jurisdictions.  We cannot perceive how counsel’s strategic decision to move for a mistrial 
                                                 
4 To the extent that Petitioner claims counsel’s failure to challenge the jury 
instruction is its own species of ineffectiveness, that is not the claim we certified and was 
not clearly raised in PCR proceedings in state court.  In any event, we proceed because 
the claim “may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 
exhaust.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); see Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. 
v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 75 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring); Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 
F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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and then to accept the trial court’s favorable jury instruction was objectively 
unreasonable—especially given that we “apply the strong presumption of competence 
that Strickland mandates,” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 196—much less prejudicial to 
Petitioner.  
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
habeas relief.    
